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CREATION, METAPHYSICS, AND ETHICS
David B. Burrell

This essay explores the ways in which specific attention (or lack thereof) to
creation can affect the manner in which we execute metaphysics or ethics.
It argues that failing to attend to an adequate expression of "the distinction"
of creator from creatures can unwittingly lead to a misrepresentation of
divinity in philosophical argument. It also offers a suggestion for understanding "post-modern" from the more ample perspective of Creek and
medieval forms of thought.

As the immodest title suggests, these "big-picture" reflections propose to
trace ways in which prevailing forms of thought can effectively distort
inquiries in philosophical theology, precisely by systematically eliminating
al1.y reference to the groLmding fact of creation. This attempt to bring to
consciousness what can easily remain presumed was itself inspired by
observing the affinities which some dimensions of "post-modern" thought
display with medieval perspectives. My own work on the way in which
Aquinas transformed Hellenic metaphysics (with help of Avicenna and
Maimonides) in tlle presence of a free creator suggests that it might be illuminating to remind ourselves how much modern philosophy has been
expressly post-medieval. That is, "creatures" had now to be autonomous,
while the relation between human persons and God became extrinsic, as
exemplified in a "divine command" ethics. Now conceived as a being preceding in existence and continuing in existence alongside some oth.er entity
called "the universe," God could not but be a threat to human beings.
Once "God" was so transmuted, creation would be conceived as this God
acting on, or "actualizing," possibilities, conceived in some sense to "be
there" already. Profiting by what I take to be an inevitable rejection of
these features of modemity, I want to construct a narrative showing how
some features of that rejectiol1. serve to highlight a medieval set of perspectives, and may even allow us to retrieve them to our profit. In that respect,
this exercise reflects a continuing concern to unseat Hegelian presumptions
endemic to any "history of philosophy" narrative. It is worth reminding
ourselves at the outset that medievals cannot be simply identified with a
classical view: the new factor (for Jews, Christians and Muslims alike) is of
course a free creator. Nor does it seem that any returl1. to a classical view
(with its "robust realism") is possible. Yet retrieving a full set of medieval
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perspectives would demand a "leap of faith"-at the very least to an intentional creator-and one can hardly ask that of philosophers.
One could, however, try to inforll1 them what that amounts to; yet that
will not be easy either, since it will entail deconstructing the post-medieval
(or modem) version, whicl1 sought to explicate a world independent of its
intemal relation to its creator, resulting in the modern image of tl1e creator
as something over against or alongside the universe: indeed, the "biggest
thing around." Yet for us, who may well all be "post-ll10dem" descriptively, "following our intuitions" regarding such matters may still be to settle
into those ll10dern grooves where tl1e relation of the universe to God is an
extrinsic one. 1 So once again, the role of comparative work in philosophy
or in theology will be to remind us of the myopia of "our intuitions" on
most any matter; and here differences in time (history) work as well as differences in space (culture), unless of course, Hegel's mindset has effectively
rendered the past past, or modemity's prejudices about the superiority of
western culture have inoculated us against leaming anything from "others." Here it is our unconscious predilections which we must examine: the
things we don't feel any compunction to read, perhaps because we already
know how to think about such things, or our settled convictions about
what a philosophical account should look like. It is this presumptive, or relatively unconscious, dimension which leads us to speak of "our intuitions,"
so exposing that will require a form of argument which is best termed
"rhetorical", since mounting straightforward arguments will inevitably
invoke those very "intuitions" which I am calling into question-like an
extrinsic relation of creator to creation, should we even speak of a creator. 2
Since I prefer to deconstruct in a cOl1structive fashion, however, I shall
try to accomplish both tasks in one by expounding the relation of creator to
creatures in a way designed to show how different is the medieval view,
thereby exposing the inadequacies of modern rel1derings of "theism." In
tl1at way, we post-moderns can have a fair view of what Jews, Christians,
or Muslims actually accept on faith, by explicating the rich traditions
which each of these faiths embodies. We shall see how utterly crucial is the
asseveration that tl1e universe is freely created by one God, as well as the
ways in Wl1ich that article of faith is variously explicated in each tradition
so as to converge on a metaphysical account of the creator as the cause of
being. The characteristics such a cause must possess will serve to identify
the creator uniquely, and lead us to characterize the things we encounter as
creatures. Even more, as Robert Sokolowski reminds us, the universe itself
is transformed froll1 the merely given context for our thought and discourse
when it is understood "as that which might not have been. The world and
everything in it is appreciated as a gift brought about by a generosity that
has no parallel in what we experience in the world. The existence of the
world now prompts our gratitude, whereas the being of the world
prompts our wonder". 3 Indeed, the very notion of contingency is radicalized: "it is not just that things could have been very different from the way
theyare; we are now able to speak of things, and of the whole, as possibly
not having been at all" (32). Yet this notion is so radical that it is hardly
accessible without that of a free creator: "the thought that tl1ingS generally,
and we ourselves, might not have existed is bearable-bearable not just
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emotionally but as a conceivability-only against the other term of this distinction, the term that must be so understood that even if nothing else did
exist, there would be no diminution of excellence" (32). So the universe
and God cannot be construed as we construe two objects within the universe; to realize this is to
begin to appreciate the strangeness of the distinction itself. In the distinctions that occur normally within the setting of the world, each term
distinguished is what it is precisely by not being that which it is distinguishable from. Its being is established partially by its othemess, and
therefore its bein.g depends on its distinction from others. But in [this]
distinction God is understood as being' God entirely apart from any
relation of othemess to the world or to the whole.... No distinction
made within the horizon of the world is like this, and therefore the act
of creation cannot be understood in terms of any action or any relationship that exists in the world. The special sense of sameness in God
'before' and 'after' creation, and the special sense of othemess between
God and the world, impose qualifications on whatever we are to say
about God and the world, about creation out of nothing, about God's
way of being present and interior to things and yet beyond them. All
the names [i.e., terms] and syntax we use for such theological discourse
have to be adapted from their normal use in the element of the idell.tities and differences within the world (32-33).
David Braine has worked out the implications of such a "distinction" for
understanding both creator and creation in his ReaZity 0/ Time and the
Existence 0/ God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). And in doing so, he is
clear regarding what needs to be deconstructed:
Unless ideas of time and causation are so developed as to exclude [it],
even the conception of God as cause of existence out of nothing is still
compatible with thinking of God as a finite being preceding in existence and continuing in existence alongside some other entity called
the Universe-compatible with giving no adequate explanations of
God's 'infinity' and 'etemity' so that to use these terms remains n1ere
rhetoric. A demiurge does not need to be simple, etemal, or infinite,
except in nan1e, nor even unique. By contrast, if we recognize that
temporal or successive existence is in itself of such a nature that nothing with temporal existence is capable either of giving rise to it from
nothing or of causing its continuance, and recognize that all temporal
things are equally impotent in this respect, whether in regard to
themselves or in regard to other things, then we shall discover that
we have arrived at a valid basis for asserting a genuine infinity and a
radical eternity to God (16).
Both Braine and Sokolowski are insisting that the proper use of expressions
like 'infinite' and 'eternal' belongs to the semantic domain established by
the creator/ creature relation. So their paradigmatic use in divinis cannot be
construed as naming properties which we could understand outside that
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unique relationship. (See Aquinas' argument [in ST 1.10.3] that "'eternity',
in the true and proper sense, belongs to God alone.") The wary reader
armed with appropriately modern skills will begin to detect a circularity
here, and may be prompt to name it "fideism." For both of these philosophers are concerned to delineate a grounding relation which itself depends
on asserting the universe to be freely created out of nothing, by a creator
whose perfection is in no way enhanced by the act of creating, so that it
must be thoroughly gratuitous. Yet while Braine executes a sustained
argument to this conclusion (sketched in outline in the citation given), and
so counters any charge of "fideism," Sokolowski is rather concerned to
show the meaningfulness of such discourse, given the faith-assertion of
free creator. Can that be called "fideism"? Not, I would suggest, in any
reprehensible meaning of that term, for he is not insisting on the truth of
the framework he introduces.
Indeed the upshot of our inquiry should help us see that any ready use
of the term 'fideism' will inevitably embody those modernist presumptionsabout faith and about reason that we are putting to question here, so its very
use should invite further questions. In fact, the postmodern climate into
which we have been transported seems to facilitate our recognizing faith as
a mode of knowing. And if that be the case, we will be able to appreciate
John Paul II's statement that "at the deepest level, the autonomy which
philosophy enjoys is rooted in the fact that reason is by its nature oriented
to truth and is equipped moreover with. the means necessary to arrive at
truth," recognizing how it derives from faith in creation. That same faith
also en1.boldens hirn to insist that "a philosophy conscious of this as its
'constitutive status' cannot but respect the demands and the data of
revealed truth."4 It will be the burden of our inquiry to show how such a
statement will inevitably sound paradoxical to us, given the presuppositions with which we initially hear it. And it is those very presuppositions,
of course, which emerge in any appeal we n1.ay make to "our intuitions"
about these critical matters.
Jaakko Hintikka has recently offered a trenchant diagnosis of the practice of "present-day analytic philosophers ... to appeal to intuitions" (note
1), comparing it usefully to the way Aristotle employs "endoxa [opinions]
or prima facie intuitions [as] raw material to be critically weighed, corrected, and integrated into a coherent view. Their presuppositions have to be
uncovered and their tacit limitations recognized before such an integration
is possible. [Indeed,l this is what most of Aristotle's own philosophical
argumentation amounts to" (138-9). He goes on to underscore the goal of
this effort: "Such a critical scrutiny of our prima facie intuitions typically
amounts to re-educating our endoxa so as to do better justice to the realities
of the conceptual situation." This will prove to be especially needed when
the language in question is imbedded in the practice of faith communities
over time, where the general weakness Hintikka's notes becomes a glaring
deficiency: "one of the most crucial failures of contemporary philosophers
has been that they have not realized the need of re-educating and re-regimenting even some of their most sacred intuitions" (139). Hintikka traces
current penchant of philosophers to rely on their intuitions to Chomsky's
"appealing to grammatical intuitions" in linguistics (132). Whatever the
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merit of this diagnosis, Hintikka makes a crucial distinction when he
judges "Chomsky's reliance on intuitions [to bel a better tactic than
philosophers' parallel ploy," noting that "linguists' intuitions pertain to the
human language ability and its products [while] philosophers' intuitions
do not pertain to the supposed faculty of intuition itself but to the truths
about which this faculty is supposed to provide knowledge" (133-4).
Grappling with Hintikka's criticisms could prove a useful propadeutic
for philosophers to engage the reflections which follow here, as would a
sensitivity to Foucault's expose of the "conceptual formations" [episteme's]
within which we invariably work. In matters pertaining to divinity, however, whoever recognizes how crucial it is that "the distinction" obtain
between creator and creatures will insist that our very "language ability"
will have to be re-educated to reflect this distinguishing feature of
Abrahamic discourse. 5 In fact, that is precisely what liturgieal and related
practices of faith-traditions are constantly engaged in effecting. So "our
inhlitions" in this domain will be doubly suspect, in terms of Hintikka's
useful distinction, and be so for believers as weIl as unbelievers, since (as
Kierkegaard reminds us in speaking of Christianity) one cannot be said to be
a person of faith so much as (at best) becoming one. 6 Aquinas' way of incorporating what Kierkegaard calls "the infinite qualitative difference" and
Sokolowski "the distinction" is to insist that the expressions we use to identify and name God will (at best) "imperfectly signify" their divine "object."7
So the mystagogy which incorporates believers into a faith-tradition will
have to incorporate ways of showing that the God spoken of-for Jews,
Christians or Muslims---cannot be an object in or even over against the universe of objects. Yet since our language is tailored to just such objects, the
very use of our language in these domains will have to strain against its
ordinary use. Aquinas was able to capitalize on an acute awareness of the
various senses of scripture, cultivated in the century preceding hirn, to
introduce a sense for analogous usage endemie to our ordinary language
and yet further enhanced by this twelfth-century appreciation of the elastici~y of scriptural references. Yet Hans Frei has shown (in his now classic
Eclipse of Biblical Narrative) how an empirieist world view succeeded in
impoverishing our sense of language and of scriptures, generating many
conundra which lacked any "feeI" for the specificities ofbiblical description.
To be reminded of such matters, however, is bound to be unsettling to
anyone-philosopher or not-whose view of the universe would exclude
such biblical or Qur'anic specificities, so the appeal to "our intuitions" will
often have a persuasive or rhetorical edge, designed precisely to foreclose
anything which OLlr language could at best "imperfectly signify." So also
will my attempt to expose such rhetorical ploys perforce employ a counterrhetoric, yet consciously so. More constructively, one of the ways in which
we set about to re-educate our prima facie intuitions aboLlt things is to test
them against the bar of other cultures, across both time and space. One of
the advantages of learning another language or immersing oneself in
another culture is to come to appreciate that doing things differently from
the way we do could serve to open us to richer human possibilities. In
short, we come to see that "our intuitions" about many things are too
restrictive. Indeed, reading a philosopher writing from another set of pre-
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suppositions should jar us to become aware of our own. For example,
when Aquinas states serenely that God can move the will freely, the statement cannot but sound paradoxical to uso Yet as we tease out the theorems
relevant to making such a statement we will begin to see why, in this
unique case of creator with creature (ST 1.111.2), "there is no contradiction
between being moved of one's own accord-[the hallmark of free action]and being moved by another" (ST 1.105.4.2), since this Other "moves our
will as the universal n10ver to the llniversal object of will, which is the
Good. And without this universal motion, [we] cannot will anything" (ST
1-2.9.6.3). The las' here offers an analogy building on statements of Plato
and Aristotle; it is not intended as a description of how this activation
takes place. What the analogy assures, however, is that the movement will
not be forced, since it is in line with the inbuilt tendency of creatures to
return to their creator, rather than opposed to it.
Rather than infer (as some have) that Aquinas must be adeterminist, we
could ask ourselves whether he nught not be construing this unique relationship of creator to creatures in ways which escape us, and even move on to
ask what factors might be present in our intellectual environment to facilitate
that escape. And since the creator/ creature relationship shapes everything
in this domain, confronting such texts could make us inquire whether our
presumptions regarding tl1e agencies involved-divine and human-have
sufficiently atiended to the unique founding relationslup of creation, indeed
of free creation. This essay makes bold to identify those presumptions as
they function in metaphysics and ethics-indeed at the jLmcture of these two
philosophical domains. We shall highlight certain presumptions as sympton1atic of our inability to conceive the creator/ creature relation, and often
enough of an outright denial of any such relationship. It may prove illustrative, however, to show how such denials often result from misconceiving
that relation, usually in ways which pit creator against creature in a zerosum game. As is invariably the case, "atheisms" can often be diagnosed as
reaction-formatiol1s to a "theism" wh.ose formulations effectively betray the
reality and mystery of divinity. These formulations can lead theists to construct complex "solutions" to the "problems" such misconceptions have generated, while the cumulative effect of contrived defenses of an unworthy
divinity may impel others into an "atheism" which leaves them bereft of the
resources the creator/ creature relation can offer.
Here much postmodern scepticism offers us an illuminating retrospective on the modern attempt to function bravely without a creator whose
very presence seemed to compromise human effort. Although it took a
few centuries for the results to emerge, it has now become problematic
whether the very notion of author can be coherent in the absence of a creator, as George Steiner has cogently argued. 8 Similarly for the self which
had been conceived as the juncture POll1t between spiritual and material
worlds, yet became the hallmark of a humanity conceived as the pinnacle
of the world as it presents itself to humal1s to be known and thence to be
improved to meet our needs. That very self becomes problematic as its
vaunted knowledge transmutes into apower which threatens the quality
of human life, if not its very survival. Moreover, since that same self was
also regarded as the touchstone of a humane ethic, we have been visited
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with the consequences of its virtual den1.ise when the absence of any inbuilt
orientation to a founding and transcendent good fails to underwrite the dignity of human beings in the face of the violence endemic to overwhelming
power-whether exercised overtly in systematic campaigns of "ethnic
cleansing," or covertly by massive economic domination. Absent the background conception (shared by Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike) of
human beings "created in the image and likeness of God," with the resultant inbuilt orientation to a good which addresses all to invite each to
become what they are called to become, human freedom is reduced to a
plethora of choices, notably more abundant to the more affluent, with no
recognizable goal for human activity. An initial euphoria at no one's being
able to "impose" such. goals on us gives way before long to an inescapable
query regarding the relative worth of the choices facing us, which re-introduces the telos as a question. When that recurrent query is met with the
dogmatic assertion that goals too are a matter of choice, an astute respondent might wonder whether that framework is not being "imposed." Yet
we shall see how such a view results directly from having to deny that we
are creatures internally related to a creator. Yet to complete the circle, we
shall also see how such a denial was facilitated by conceiving that relation
to be external rather than internal, for a creator alongside the universe
would have to be dispensed with: metaphysically, for the sake of parsimony, and ethically to obviate heteronomy.

Metaphysics ofsuch Matters
The sinuous, often labyrinthine, effects of denying the creator / creature
relationship, evident in so much postmodern literature, should alert us to
the inherent difficulty in conceiving that relation. Yet here we receive
assistance fron1. another dimension of postmodern sensibility, which can
open us, in the spirit of Gadamer, to appreciate how faith (as embodied in
a self-critical faith-tradition) can be a mode of knowing. For classical
efforts to "prove the existence of God" as a preamble to faith can now be
seen to have functioned properly only in a milieu of faith. David Braine's
efforts, for example, in his recent Reality of Time and the Existence of God,
turn on an appreciation of the "novelty of existence," which makes one
look to a creator to assure anything's continuing to exist; yet one might
wonder whether the ground of such an appreciation in a robust distinction
between essence and existing was not itself prepared by a background belief
in free creation. As Gadamer has reminded us, however, such an apparent
circularity may in fact be more natural than vicious, just as we have come
to appreciate how much trust the exercise of reason presupposes. (Indeed,
John Paul Il's recent proposal that faith offers the best defense of reason
does not sound so strange to contemporary ears as it would have seemed
to a Voltaire, for we have become used to complaints that we have "lost
our faith in reason," a phrase ostensibly oxymoronic to modernist ears.) So
we should be prepared to recognize a relationship between faith and reason as internal as that between other presuppositions which we bring to
OLlr inquiries, as well as the conclusions we explicitly draw from them.
h1.deed, even more so in matters of faith, for while any set of presupposi-
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tions constitutes an horizon for inquiry, faith-traditions ask us to advert
more consciously to the horizon offered, since it explicitly outstrips our
ordinary perceptions. As Robert Sokolowski reminded us in presenting
"the distinction" of creator from creatures, the universe emerges from that
distinction as a new kind of whole only conceivable "against the other term
of this distinction" (32), a free creator. Yet since a free creator is a matter of
faith, he also insists that "the distinction is glimpsed on the margin of reason; [indeed] at the intersection of reason and faith" (39). Yet Sokolowski's
recurring reminders of the singularity of this "distinction" should alert us
to the ease with which we can find ourselves assimilating it to an ordinary
one in which the two terms-God and universe-will be unwittingly conceived as two items within the universe itself. This can take place imperceptibly, even in efforts to exalt God as, say, the "necessary being" who
thereby "exists in all possible worlds." This formula succeeds in setting
God off from all other beings, yet does so in a way which relies on the ordinary distinction of such beings among themselves, and without a hint of
the constitutive creator / creature relation.
Yet if that very relation is tolerable only within the context of revelation,
as Sokolowski suggests, David Braine reminds us how such a "revelation
needs the concept of a being which is underivative, but whose underivativeness is not just de facta but intrinsic, arising from a difference in the way
this being possesses existence, a difference setting it apart from all creatures and rendering it incapable of h.aving a cause: it has to exist 'of itself'
without causing its own existence" (348). And he offers yet another diagnosis of potential blockage to such an understanding of the creator:
"Meantirne, models of the relation of God and the world derived from
post-Cartesian understandings whereby mind and body stood in parallelism or interactive relationships had invited an anthropomorphic modeling of God's relation to the World either upon an interactionist basis or
upon a deistic or 'strong predestinationist' picture within which God's
decrees established everything at the beginning. But such a parallelism is
at once excluded by the non-finite or incomparable nature of God involved
in His incompositeness: His immediacy is not that of a coeval co-finite
being but that of a root of temporal continuance transcending time" (352).
So a proper conception of the relation between creator and creatures will
entail a proper conception of God, yet since in the Abrahamic framework
that means the One who originates all that is, the two conceptions are
strictly correlative. An.d if Braine is correct (as I contend he is, referring
those interested to his careful reasoning), properly conceiving the relation
between creator and creatures will entail conceiving a being whose very
nature is to-be, and is in that radical sense incomposite. Yet since such a
conception will have to be radically negative, the same must be said for the
relation of that One to all that iso But if that be the case, how can we possibly proceed in philosophical th.eology?
Very carefully, I would suggest, as porcupines are purported to do. Yet
as Socrates reminded us, unknowing should be a preferred strategy for
approaching many sign.ificant things in life, like a society's learning how to
welcome its handicapped members, or our welcoming those whom the
dominant society regards as deviant and so would do its best to explain
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away. Indeed, whenever we sense that a strategy of explanation an10unts to
explaining away facts purportedly "inexplicable" to us, wisdom will dictate a strategy of unknowing. So any theology worthy of its name will
have to acquire and display appropriately negative strategies. Yet as the
current postmodern climate forcibly reminds us, this challenge is hardly
lach-specific to philosophical theologians, for attempts to circumvent that
entire domaiI1leave us with more negation than elation. What then are the
costs and benefits of retrieving a medieval mindset? The ostensible costs
entail developing a keen appreciation for the symbolic dimensions of discourse, which a unilateral focus on "arguments" can easily suppress.
Symbolic discourse, disciplined to identify and exploit paradigm instances,
becomes properly analogous language wl1ich we can then use to refer to
that term of the distinction which is the source of all. For such a One will
have to be in such a way that its being need not be caused yet it will be the
source of anything else that iso So, as Anselm saw, it cannot not be, yet not
merely as a "necessary being" which is a feature 01 any possible scenario,
but rather as the source of anything else's being at all.
Here is where the celebrated distinction of essence from existing
enters philosophical discourse, for it first appeared as the attempt of an
Islamic philosopher, Ibn Sina [Avicenna], to codify how this One from
whom all-that-is emanates could be distinguished from everything else.
That attempt foundered as he resorted to the distinction between substance
and accident to identify existing as an "aceident," yet Aquinas would soon
offer an alternative formulation which transformed Aristotle's master categories of potency and act to loeate existing as an act, indeed, the "aet of
acts."9 Since the very distinction of essence from existing, however, was
born of an attempt to determine the relation of all-that-is to its necessarily
existing source, we might ask whether a distinction so basic can even be
perceived in the absence of affirn1ing a creator, or whether this distinction
is not the counterpart in creation of the master distinction of creator from
creatures? My contention is that the two distinetions are internally related,
although a phenomenological inquiry into the "novelty of existing" should
serve to illuminate David Braine's conclusion that "the positive existence of
substances is an actuality and not just a fact" (156). And that, indeed, is the
upshot of the celebrated distinctio11: that existing Cal1not be a feature of
things, and so must playa unique predicative role. lo Trying to discern
what that role amounts to will carry us into logical domains similar to that
which the master distinction of creator/ creature introduces, so the two distinctions appear to be internally related; indeed, the essence/existing distinction offers a sign of the creator's presence to and action in creation
which alternatives accounts cannot but obscure ll .
So how do those (like Aquinas) who recognize both distinctions, if not
their inner linkage, characterize the master relation of creator to creatures?
A perspicuous and suggestive treatment of this can be found in a comparative study of Aquinas and Sankara, presented in Sara Crant's 1989 Teape
lectures. 12 As she puts it:
In India as in Creece, the ultimate question must always be that of the
relation between the supreme unchanging Reality and the world of
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coming-to-be and passing away, the eternal Self and what appears as
non-Self, and no epistemology can stand secure as long as this question remains unanswered. [It is indeed this startling contention which
this essay has been exploring.] ... A systematic study of Sankara's use
of relation.al terms made it quite clear to me that he agrees with St.
Thomas Aquinas in regarding the relation between creation and the
ultimate Source of all being as a non-reciprocal dependence relation; Le.,
a relation in which subsistent effect or "relative absolute" is dependent
on its cause for its very existence as a subsistent entity, whereas the cause
is in no way dependent on the effect for its subsistence, though there is a
necessary logical relation between cause and effect; i.e., a relation which is
perceived by the mind when it reflects on the implications of the existence of the cosmos.
Her final observation about a "necessary logical relation" is quite compatible with regarding creating as a free action of the creator, for its import is
intended to capture Aquin.as' identification of "creation in. the creature [as]
nothing other than a relation of sorts to the creator as the principle of its
existing" (ST 1.45.3). So the very existence [esse] of a creature is an esse-ad,
an existing which is itself a relation to its source. Nothing could better
express the way in which Aquinas' formulation of the essence/existing
distinction transforms Aristotle than to point out that what for Aristotle
"exists in itself" (substance) is for Aquinas derived from an Other in its
very in-itselfness, or substantiality.13 Yet since the Other is the cause of
being, each thing which exists-to the creator also exists in itself: derived
existence is no less substantial when it is derived from the One-who-is, so it
would appear that one could succeed in talking of existing things without
explicitly referring them to their source. "Th.e distinction," in otl1.er words,
need not appear. But that simply reminds us how unique a non-reciprocal
relation of dependence must be: it characterizes one relation only, that of
creatures to creator.
If creator and creature were distinct from each other in an ordinary way,
the relation-even one of dependence-could not be non-reciprocal; for
ordinarily the fact that something depends from an originating agent, as a
child from a parent, must mark a difference in that agent itself. Yet the fact
that a cause of being, properly speaking, is not affected by causing all-thatis does not imply remoteness or uncaring; indeed, quite the opposite. For
such a One must cause in such a way as to be present in each creature as
that to which it is oriented in its very existing. In that sense, this One cannot be considered as other than what it creates, in an ordinary sense of that
term; just as the creature's esse-ad assures that it cannot be separately from
its source. 14 So it will not work simply to contrast creation to emanation, or
to picture the creator distinct (in the ordinary sense) from creation by contrast with a more pantheistic image. Indeed, it is to avoid such infelicities
of imagination that Sara Grant has recourse to Sankara's sophisticated
notion of non-duality to call our attention in an arresting way to the utter
uniqueness of "the distinction" which must indeed hold between creator
and creation, but cannot be pictLlred in any contrastive manner. 15 Nor does
Aquinas feel any compunction at defining creation as the "emanation df all
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of being from its universal cause [emanatio totius entis a cause universali]/I (ST
1.45.1). Indeed, once he has emptied the emanation scheme of any mediating role, he can find no better way of marking the uniqueness of the causal
relation of creation than using the term 'emanation' to articulate it. 16 For
once the scheme has been gutted, that sui-generis descriptor should serve to
divert us from imaging the creator over-against the universe, as an entity
exercising causaI efficacy on anything-that-is in a manner parallel to causation within the universe. 17 While the all-important "distinction" preserves
God's freedom in creating, which the emanation scheme invariably finesses, we must nevertheless be wary of picturing that distinction in a fashion
which assimilates the creator to another item within the universe. 18
Participation, rather than concursus, thus becomes the operative metaphor
to describe the relation of creatures to the creator, as Rudi teVelde has
shown so weIl (note 13). Harm Goris has shown how close attention to the
uniqueness of the creator/ creature relation, with its attendant corollary of
participation as a way of articulating this sui-generis causaI relation, can neutralize many of the cunundra found in the pages of Faith and Philosophy.19
For all the ingenious efforts writers expend to adapt the causal analysis
developed for interaction among created agents, they invariably side-step
the metaphysical effort it takes to transfornl that apparatus in the face of the
unique creator/ creature relation. As a sign of this initial failing, 'God' is seldom referred to as 'the creator', but rather introduced as an agent among
other agents, albeit more powerful, suggesting the caricature: "the biggest
thing around./I As an unwitting verification of Aristotle's observation that a
small but significant mistake in the beginning becomes a monstrous one in
the end, however, readers of such sophisticated adaptations will before long
wonder what happened to tlLe original question: God's unique relation to
the universe which God alone creates, and does so without presupposing
anything at all. Moreover, the history of philosophical theology clearly
shows that when philosophical strategies are unable to respect these originating religious convictions, what results is a forced option between a
pietism bereft of the critical philosophical edge which theological skills
demand (as "faith seeking tmderstanding/l) or an atheism triggered by the
failure of philosophy to rise to a properly divine theos.

Implications for Ethics
The chasm between medieval and modem thought regarding humalL freedom turns on whether one regards free human actions as at root responses
or initiatives. In a crude sense, the difference could be marked by contrasting Plato's' account with Aristotle's, where Plato insisted on human understanding as drawn to "the good/l with human actions deriving from that
inbuilt orientation, wlLereas Aristotle insisted that free human agents be
themselves the initiators of their actions, to assure proper responsibility:
"the buck stops here./I Yet the closer we regard Aristotle in most matters, the
nl0re we see his accounts beholden to Plato, and this one is no exception: he
endorses at the outset of his Nichomachean Ethics the Platonic axiom that
"every art and every investigation, and similarly every action and pursuit, is
considered to ainl at some good" (EN 1094a1). Augustine will profit from
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the revelation of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures to ground Plato's pervasive eros in the originating intention of the creator: "You have made us for
Yourself, 0 Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in Thee." In fact,
initiative as such holds little merit for Augustine, who opposes the senseless
initiative of his boyhood escapades to a schooling of desire by way of "spiritual exercises." In fact, as the work of Pierre Hadot allows us to see, his
gradual predilection for Christianity over Platonism had precisely to do with
the kind and quality of practices which each recon1ffiended as way of guiding human beings to what is true. 20 Aquinas will utilize Aristotle's account,
yet proceed to embed it WithiIL an immediate relation to a creator who not
only inscribes the generic response in all rational creatures but activates it as
weIl. That will allow him to give an account of our purported self-determination in a way which relies on the tendelLcies bLült into created natures and
also identifies the initiator of willing with the free originator of all that iso
Such an account allows free creatures to be initiators in the sense of disceming this rather than that as more consonant with the original orientation,
while reserving the activating power to God. This results in an elucidation
of the doctrine of creation within the realm of willing, finding in free creatures traces of the creator which ordinarily would not appeal".
Indeed, Aquinas meets the concern of objectors, who sense that one
wlLo is so moved could not really be free, by recalling the founding relation of creature to creator: while "the very meaning of voluntary activity
denotes an internal principle within the subject, this ... does not have to be
the utterly first principle, moving yet unmoved by all else. The proximate
principle is internal, but the ultimately first principle is external, as indeed
it is for natural movement, this being the cause setting nature in motion"
(ST 1-2.9.4.1). The implicit reference to Aristotle's "unmoved mover" is
more by way of illustration than explication, of course, since the creator is
far more than that. Yet by way of commentary on the use of "external
[mover]" here, he acknowledges in another context that "to be moved voluntarily is to be moved of one's own accord, i.e., from a resource within.
That inner resource, however, may derive from some other, outward
source. In this sense there is no contradiction between being moved of
ane's own accord and being moved by another" (ST 1.105.4.2). Yet that
"other" is limited to the One, the unique source of all: "God alone can
really induce a change of this kind in the will" (ST 1.111.2); that is, move
it freely in such a way that it moves itself. Moreover, since God is the creator of all, bestowing the esse which "is more intimately and profoundly
interior to things than anything else" (ST 1.8.1), such a One can only be
called "external" to the creature in the unique sense determined by the
distinction of creature from creator. So the free actions which creatures
perform will correspond to Aristotle's demand that they be self-movers,
but not ultimately so, for each is moved by the ultimate Good in such a
way that a free action will be a discriminating response to the draw of
God. Roderick Chisholm's assertion (in his 1964 Lindley lecture) dramatizes the crucial difference in horizons from Aquinas: "if we are respolLsible, ... then we have a prerogative which some would attribute only to
God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover ulLmoved."21 Unless, that
is, our freedom and responsibility be that of creatures of a free creator.
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We can use the same lecture to introduce the next interlocutor in our
narrative of h1.1man freedom, as Chisholm invokes "another pair of
medieval terms [to] say that the metaphysical problem of freedom does not
concern the actus imperatus; it does not concern the question whether we
are free to accomplish whatever it is that we will or set out to do; it concerns the actus elicitus, the question whether we are free to will or to set out
to do those things that we do will or set out to do" (ibid). Here freedom, as
embedded in a classical horizon reinforced by a doctrine of creation, where
the origin of willing-the Good-motivates all human actions, making of
each an actus imperatus, is contrasted with an "unfettered" freedom whereby the act emerges spontaneously within each free agent: Scotus' actus elicitus. The proximate source of this distinction seems to have been the COl1.demnations of 1277, which may have motivated John Duns Scotus to
attempt to establish will as an agent in its OWIl right, independent of the
intellect whose counsel it needs. Scotus thereby sought to enshrine human
freedom in a self-moving faculty-the will-which could itself "elicit" acts.
Effectively separated from "outside" influences, like discernment, human
responsibility was secured by making the will a first mover. Yet its effect
was also to remove freedom from its creaturely context and so set the stage
for modernity and Kant's particular way of insisting that "only wills can be
good." We can see how this separation occurred by contrasting Scotus'
account with that of Thomas Aquinas, whom he often criticized. Where
Aquinas considers will in the line of nature, Scotus opposes the freedom of
will to the necessity of nature; where Aquinas expounds willing by analogy with reasoning and reHes 011. the complementarity of these parallel intellectual faculties to construct the dynamics of willing as a moved movement, Scotus gives ma11.ifest priority to will as an l.l11.mOved (or
"autonomous") mover. What separates them, as we have noted, is a
diverse set of preoccupations, proximate among wl1.ich must be counted
the condemnations of 1277, which arose in part because some were not as
careful as Aquinas in explicating tl1.e intellect's relation to willing. 22 Yet
they divide even more, it seems, on their way of conceiving the relation of
creature to its creator.
With regard to our relation to God as our creator, Aquinas had found
Aristotle's conception of natures with inbuilt aims to be a useful conceptual tool for elaborating the activity of intentional beings, now created in the
image of their maker, whose natures would be oriented to that same One
as tl1.eir goal, yet that goal would orlly be realized through their free activity. (This activity will become even more intentionally a response in the light
of the freely initiated relationship identified with divine grace.) Moreover,
the Aristotelian principle, "wl1.atever is in motion is moved by another,"
offered Aquinas a way of showing how the dependence of such beings on
the One origiI1.ating them could be incorporated into that very activity: the
inbuilt orientation together with the ll1.itial "specification" of the will by
that One to "the good" accounts for the will's ability to originate activity,
without however determining the 01.ltcome of any choice. For the "comprehensive good" is not itself something chosen; whatever is chosen will
be a means to this or lesser ends subordinate to it. And even in these choices, while the will may be specified (or "informed") by what one perceives
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to be best for one, the action itself flows from the action of the will: so "for
Aquinas as weIl as for Scotus, there are no sufficient conditions of the choice
antecedent to the choice itself."23 Yet that activity will always be conceived,
for Aquinas, as the activity of a creature in the manner we have sketched;
whereas for Scotus, it will be affirmed to be such, but conceived as the
activity of a being endowed with a capacity to originate activity, which
enables it to "co-operate" with the divine will in a fully free act, which
would direct it to its true end. 24 Indeed, the notion of cooperation (or "concurrence") represents Scotus' mature position on the relation of intellect
an.d will in. producing a free act, with the intellect (as a "natural agent")
subordinated to the inherently free activity of the will "to elicit an act."25
And once the created agent is deemed to be autonomous, precisely to guarantee its capacity of initiation, then creature and creator will also be conceived in parallel, the divine activity will be termed "concursus," and the
stage is set for a zero-sum game in which one protagonist's gain is the
other's loss. We have seen how such a perspective fails to incorporate the
unique founding relation, creation, which seems best elucidated by a metaphysics which can understand act analogously and thereby indicate how
the originating activity of the creator continues to make the creature to be
an agent in its own right. Aquinas puts this elegantly when he transforms
the emanation scheme to schematize the providential care of a free creator:
"divine providence works through intermediaries ..., not through any
impotence on [God's] part, but from the abundance of [divine] goodness
imparting to creatures also the dignity of causing" (ST 1.22.3).
Kant completed the reversal Scotus began, when he so opposed freedom
to desire that eros came to be seen as inhibiting free actions rather than identified as their source. How could our actions be genuinely free-read
"autonomous"-if they originated in a response? Would l1.0t that make
them heteronomous? We must also realize, of course, how Kant was constrained to move within an entirely different world, since once Scotus had
effectively "detach[ed] tl1.e will from the lure of the good, ... Christian virtue
itself was being redefined as obedience to authority, just as faith itself
became defined as a set of propositions."26 So Kant needed to find a source
of good actions more interior than responding to a divine command, especially since the divine l1.ad become another entity subsisting alongside the
universe, as David Braine has noted. So the makings of the distinctively
modern (or "libertarian") notion of freedom begin to accumulate. 27 The
autonomous actus elicitus becomes understood as "the ability to do otherwise" in the very acting itself, so nothing can "determine" the act but the actor
whose act alone it iso Indeed, to be free, on such an account, the action itself
must possess an "off/on" indeterminacy decided by the agent in performing
the act. Sympathetic critics like Eleonore Stump have asked whether such a
notion is pragmatically coherent---eould a mother really have dOl1.e otherwise than not slit her child's throat?-so what is at stake is a conception of
the acting self. 28 A contextual account of created human action like
Aquinas' also allows that creatures are capable of an utterly initiatory role,
but in the terms of that account, it will not be one of acting but of failing to
act: of "refusing" to enter into tl1.e process initiated by actively willing "the
good." Such an act, however, defines sin rather than offers the paradigm of
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a free action for Aquinas, who would agree with Chisholm that we can
indeed be "like unto God," but only in a self-destructive sense.
Kierkegaard's Sickness unto Death offers a belated witness to the classical
paradigm in defining the self as a relating: to itself, indeed, but when fully
realized-that is, "when despair is completely eradicated, ... the self is
grounded transparently in the power that established it." At the end of the
work, he cannily notes that this formula for a realized self is also the "definition of faith," as he has elaborated the radical freedom of a disrelated self as
"the despair of defiance, or offense."29 The crucial turning point in this narrative, as we have suggested, lies with Scotus, whose separation of will from
intellect upset the delicate balance in Aquinas' accollnt, for whom will is
ever the intellectual appetite. 30 So both intellect and will, if you will, are
operative in any action, whereas on Scotus' account it is will which does it,
while consulting intellect, precisely to preserve th.at human initiative which
would come to be assimilated to autonomy. Whereas on the classical
account, bolstered by the background metaphysics of an intentional creator,
desire animates throughout as intellect discriminates, and good reigns
supreme as what alone elicits a free response.
It is critical to the Abrahamic traditions, of course, that following the
Torah, Jesus, or the "straight path" of the Qur'an not be adjudged "heteronomous" behavior, so each of the traditions must assert the revealed
Word of God to be the eternal pattern according to which the universe is
made, so that responding to its historieal revelation is areturn to one's origins. The unsung hero of our story, however, is the only one who succeeded in singing that account: Dante. For his way of redeeming human desire

by discovering its poetic modulation in his love for Beatrice allowed hirn to
image sin itself as the absence of desire: Satan forever encased in a block of
ice, the very negation of eros; whereas his Puritan look-alike, Milton, mirrored Kant's bifurcation by renderill_g the very center of hell as araging
fire: desire uncontrolled! Could it be that the seventeenth century failed to
image evil/sin as the utter privatioIl of good (including the good of eros/passion) because its theologians had failed to render "the distinction" adequately? For if God could no longer be presented as the creating Good, "to
whom it is proper to be in all things, and intimately so" (ST 1.8.1), but had
to be pictured as an other being, over against creation and thereby transcending it, there could be no analogous divine presence in our human
striving (eros), bllt rather the "otherness" of the divine will which one
could obey only by resisting such this-worldly yeamings. The absence of a
participated esse as the ground and source of all authentie action would
make any action's authenticity extrinsic to the act rather than its natural
outcome: only by adhering to an extrinsic divine will en1bodied in a
covenant freely bestowed could one escape the snares of passion or eros.
A frightening picture, certairl1y, setting the stage for Kant's autonomy to
be subverted by Freud's gratification, and freedom's becoming what it has
become in our time: "doing what I wanna do," quite oblivious of Socrates'
patent analysis of "wanna" as the most telling example of bondage to parts
of ourselves that in fact resist "the good" by escaping the rule of logos.
Freedom as "self-gratification" and hence leading (as Freud hirnself realized) to death rather than to the possibility of a transformed life, represents
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the final irony of Kant's attempt to formulate an autonomous self. For
however noble his intentions may have been: to bring faith in a creator
and redeemer back in by another door; it was the ersatz lure of an
autonomous self which prevailed for modemity, leading ineluctably (as we
see on all sides) to the no-self of post-modernity. Can there be a happier
way to tell this story? Is a world without a creator-once our vista has
been opened to imagine one-inescapably condemned to nihilism? Gr are
we able to grab the nettle presented here, and move through this
"nihilism" to a fresh. theological perspective?31 In any case, if we are fated to
be postmodern, then appreciating how it is that the modern perspective
was expressly post-medieval should prepare us for many ways to render
our post-(post-medieval) situation. Yet even if the two 'post's' should
allow us to imagine retrieving some medieval perspectives, they cannot
but be retrieved in a thoroughly post-modern fashionP2
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